It would not be surprising if the events at Fukushima over the past two months impart a sense of déjà vu, not only to the nuclear industry but also to those who have watched, debated and analysed the industry, including its existing and prospective clients.
In one sense the moment is unique―with three reactors having suffered partial core meltdowns and hydrogen explosions rupturing or destroying their outer containment buildings, an apparent breach of the primary containment in at least one unit, a series of fires in a spent fuel storage pond, as well as radioactive plumes emitted with radiation levels sufficient to stand in reasonable but still debateable comparison to (and probably less than) those from the Chernobyl accident.
In another sense the moment has a haunting familiarity. As long ago as 1977, Arena ran a special issue with a focus on nuclear power. 1 In one of the contributed articles,
noting the increasing opposition to the industry worldwide, I commented on the rapid drop in nuclear reactor orders and the industry’s expectations over the previous few years.2 In particular, in the six years from 1972 to1978 the industry’s expectations of the amount of nuclear power to be generated in the world in 2000 dropped by 72 per cent (from 3450 GWe to 728 GWe). In the United States nuclear reactor orders plummeted from thirty-five in 1973 to three in 1976, with the US Deputy Energy Secretary worrying in 1977 that the nuclear option in the United States ‘has essentially disappeared’.3
That same year, as the Arena issue appeared, Amory Lovins, a well-known energy analyst (and for many years now, director of his successful Rocky Mountains Institute), memorably testified to a US Congressional committee that
It is my considered judgement that nuclear power is dead, in the sense of a Brontosaurs that has had its spinal cord cut but because it’s so big and has all those ganglia near the tail some place, can keep thrashing about for years not knowing it is dead yet.4
Shadows from the Past
While the industry never actually died, it certainly remained remarkably stunted against its earlier aspirations, largely living off existing new, replacement and maintenance contracts. As it turned out, compared to the 1972 expectation of 3450 GWe, actual world nuclear capacity in the year 2000 was only 350 GWe. Eleven years later, in April 2011, generating capacity was not much bigger, at 370 GWe, and the number of operating reactors was seven fewer than in 2002.5
In relation to the current moment, there is much to be learned from what has come before. We should note that the strong downturn in nuclear expectations was not caused by the accidents at Three Mile Island (1979) and the subsequent fire at Chernobyl (1986). The downturn had already begun over the previous decade, with plummeting orders and expectations. As Craig Severance put it, looking back at Three Mile Island, ‘If anything the accident simply capped off a trend which was already occurring. Utility executives and Wall Street financiers were the ones who stopped nuclear power’s expansion in the 1970s’.6 A simple explanation offered by Lovins, continuing his 1977 testimony, was that the more than tenfold decline in nuclear expectations was ‘due to straight forward market forces: as Adam Smith might have said, the Invisible Fist strikes again’.7
Powerful though the image is, the dynamics of ‘the invisible fist’ require analysis. The key underlying mechanism was clear for those who were open to seeing it in the late 1970s. As a landmark study by Bupp and Derian at Harvard Business School showed, the nuclear industry was beset by rising costs, centred on the overall cost of building nuclear reactors (capital costs).8 For nuclear reactors built between 1966 and 1977, actual realised nuclear construction costs on average overshot by 209‒380 per cent (almost four times as much) the original cost estimates offered at the start of construction.9
The central point is that these costs were associated with greatly lengthened licensing times―the time between commitment to embark on a reactor project and the moment it actually started putting electricity into the commercial grid. These extended times of
course represented increased interest payments. But they were also a proxy for much else, including delays due to changes to reactor design consequent on new emerging problems; tightening of the regulation environment; and an associated widespread pattern of local, national and global opposition to nuclear power. Opposition was particularly intense wherever reactors were contemplated; it was fuelled by the risks revealed with every successive reactor incident. This in turn led to pressures for increasing elaboration in the design, extension of construction time and the escalating costs of building reactors.10
A key to the nuclear industry has been the featherbed of subsidies on which its economics have rested since its inception.11 It is reasonable to argue that the key economic role of the global opposition to nuclear power has been to provide a boundary condition to the extent to which further subsidies could be extended to the never fully economic, but politically highly influential, nuclear industry. Historically, the opposition was assisted in this by the increasing emphasis within the broader global economy for economic rationalisation, deregulation and privatisation. Taken together, these have been an important factor in strengthening the impact of the ‘invisible fist’ upon the nuclear industry, notably in the United States and United Kingdom.
The factors shaping the increases in reactor costs are thus complex. The case of France is particularly interesting because the French program is usually considered the success story of the industry. Yet even there, with the benefits of a highly centralised and determined state-sponsored nuclear program that was prepared to run roughshod over the initially substantial opposition, costs were not contained in the long run.
In a study published in Energy Policy, Grubler reports that the ambitious French building of nuclear reactors, over the period 1980‒96, exhibited a ‘negative learning curve’ with costs rising rapidly in real terms.12 A subsequent analysis by Komanoff, using Grubler’s data, shows that over that period the program’s electricity costs grew by about 60 per cent in real terms (inflation adjusted). Most importantly, in the end the program departed from a deliberate process of producing reactors which avoided innovation. Once the design was changed (to the larger 1.5 GWe ‘N4’ reactors), the cost to build the reactors rose to twice as much per GWe as the previous fifty-four reactors already built.13
Here the causes are telling. It was the interests of the two central agencies―EDF (Électricité de France) and the CEA (le Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique)―combined that pushed the program in the direction of higher costs. As Grubler puts it,
These endogeneous non-safety drivers of design changes can be summarized simply as: ever larger scale and more output (the interest of the EDF), more French equipment and components (the interest of the nuclear equipment industry), and finally technological leadership (the interest of the CEA).
Here we see the extent to which the economics of nuclear power can be determined by extrinsic factors, which in large part derive not from the market but from the insulation of the industry from it. Where a program is bureaucratic in its nature, bureaucratic interests can profoundly shape its apparent economics.
This draws our attention to an endemic characteristic of the nuclear industry. While many renewable technologies (for example, solar cells, windmills, biofuel units) can be constructed as large numbers of small units and thus enjoy economies of scale from mass production, nuclear power shows no such tendency. Rather, the tendency has been that attempting economies of scale through building larger units has only added additional complexities that in the end rebound in more unexpected outcomes and thus greater costs and economic risk.14
The Invisible Fist Post Fukushima
Fukushima takes us forward a quarter of a century to what is in some telling ways a similar moment to that of the end of the 1970s. The nine year period prior to the Fukushima accident, from 2002, was once again a moment when the nuclear industry aspired to raise its fortunes, especially in the face of climate change. In this context there was much marketing of a supposedly already occurring ‘nuclear renaissance’. While there are reasons to doubt much of the supporting rhetoric and the marketed vision itself, Fukushima is now widely believed to represent a significant obstacle in the way of its realisation.
At the very time the industry thought it might have achieved at least a moral edge in arguing that nuclear power is an essential component of meeting greenhouse gas reduction targets, the risks of nuclear power are again featuring highly in debates about its future. Once more, despite the apparent capacity of the nuclear industry to make some contribution to a lower carbon trajectory, and much stronger rhetoric around this, this came at a time when the industry’s position was actually still quite delicate. Here the twin invisible forces―of ionising radiation and the market’s invisible hand―have combined to seriously undermine, at least potentially, the fortunes of the nuclear industry.
There are a range of reasons for this, which are very nicely summarised in a recent Worldwatch Institute report by Schneider, Frogatt and Thomas.15 Crucially, as they note, in most countries the capital costs of nuclear reactors continue to increase rapidly. Thus before 2007 estimated costs for new nuclear reactors proposed for construction in the United States were cited at USD four billion for a typical 1 GWe reactor. Now costs of USD five–six billion are being cited by Moody’s Investment Services, while the Florida Public Service Commission concluded that two new units would cost USD 5.5–8.1 billion per GWe.16
According to one report, Areva now quotes the cost of a new nuclear reactor at USD eight billion. Toshiba has raised its quote to San Antonio for a twin reactor from USD thirteen to seventeen billion, while a quote to Ontario of USD 10.8 billion per GWe. In both cases interest in building the units was killed.17
The United States continues to be a disaster story for the nuclear industry, with no new nuclear reactors actually ordered and built for more than thirty years, and with many cancelled orders. Here, the invisible fist has been more obviously at work,
strengthened by potent local citizen opposition, which has tended to inflict bruising deterrence on those who might otherwise seek to achieve further protection for the industry (whether through monetary subsidies or the externalisation of risk).
A careful 2009 study by Craig Severance uses statistical analysis of the relationship between forecasts made for costs of future reactor projects and the actual final costs
when they finally start generating electricity. On the basis of this study, taking into account full costs, but assuming the most optimistic schedule is put forward in new US nuclear plant proposals, he concludes that the most likely cost of building a nuclear reactor is USD 10.5 billion per GWe.18
Severance concludes that the business case for installing a nuclear reactor is confronted with a uniquely perilous set of business risks potentially arising from escalating costs, construction delays, changing financial circumstances over the at least ten year construction period, changes to the regulatory environment, unresolved costs of nuclear waste disposal, the ‘wildcard: organized opposition’, all in the context of the issues of nuclear proliferation, terrorist attack and the impacts of the plutonium economy; and the consequent danger of a plant never being completed or not being allowed to run its intended generating lifetime after enormous investment.
Fallout from Fukushima
While the radioactive fallout from Fukushima is still being generated, with serious consequences especially for vulnerable exposed sub-populations (such as children in ‘hot spots’), it is the economic fallout which may, in the long run, have more global implications. To the extent that electrical utilities considering a nuclear project are required to consider business risks (which are not taken over by consumers or government), these risks will shape the vulnerability and fortunes of the project. Fragile as the industry is in the face of such considerations, Fukushima adds considerably greater stress.
Reactor operating extensions under pressure
Ironically, the industry’s tendency to blame the serious situation at Fukushima on the fact that those reactors are very old creates a further economic risk.
Of course it is not necessarily the case that recent design decisions for new reactors would have precluded this particular sequence of events. The key proximate cause of the partial meltdowns was the inability to supply adequate cooling water primarily
because power failed. Power failed because the external supply was destroyed, with the backup generators flooded and thus rendered useless. The flooding occurred because the walls surrounding the generators were not high enough to prevent flooding. As has been pointed out by numerous observers, the height of the tsunami surge (fourteen metres) has precedents in the history of the area, including a thirty metre surge in Onagawa in 1993, among a history of other such surges, including the giant Jogan tsunami of 869 CE.19 It was a commercial decision not to mitigate this known risk by building higher walls.
Even taken at face value, however, the argument that old reactors are not as safe as new ones puts considerable pressure on the industry to replace old with new. But this is a big task because as there have been low order rates in the last several decades; as Schneider and colleagues note, the average age of the world’s operating reactor ‘fleet’ is old―twenty-six years―with some having operated for more than forty years. The average age of the 130 reactors already closed is twenty-two years, and this casts a dark shadow over older plants still operating and proposals by governments and industry to extend the permitted lifetimes of existing plants. As the Fukushima crisis began, the German government’s early decision to suspend the operation of reactors
over thirty years old was the first step in their decision now to phase out nuclear power and move to renewables.
A postscript to a 2011 report by MIT, ‘The Future of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle’, added hastily as it was going to press the following likely implications: ‘costs are likely to go up’ because of new safety design requirements; ‘the relicensing of forty year old nuclear plants for another twenty years of operation will face additional scrutiny’ and some licensing extensions already granted may ‘be revisited’; the entire spent fuel management system ‘is likely to be revaluated’. Finally, it notes, ‘How these and other post-Fukushima issues are resolved will have major implications for the future of nuclear power …’20
New generation reactors
It is also useful to comment on the potential role of and constraints on the so-called new generation reactors. While there has been much marketing of the claimed virtues of new designs, the safest and cheapest nuclear reactors are always those still on paper. In the same way that armies are only in danger of defeat when mobilised in battle, it is when new designs begin to be deployed in practice that the unanticipated threats can appear. Because reactors are extraordinarily complex, the room for the unexpected to undermine confident predictions is wide.
Many innovations follow an economist’s ‘bucket curve’, with early high incidents of the unexpected, a slow stabilisation as time progresses and more copies and improvements are made, followed in due course by an increase in incidents as such innovations start to approach their design lifetime. The old reactors are in this latter stage; the new ones in the former.
One example of how horribly wrong a design ‘reform’ can be was provided by Fermi I Fast Breeder reactor at Laguna Beach, Michigan, in 1963. When it was started up it rapidly went into a partial core meltdown. The cause: a blocked cooling channel obstructed by a piece of a safety device intended to reduce the likelihood of a meltdown leading to nuclear explosion.21
With any new design there is always the likelihood that events will follow sequences which have not been anticipated, however extensive the preparatory analysis. As the Generation IV reactors largely remain on the drawing board, it is sufficient to say here that there are a number of concerns about their actual safety that remain to be addressed, despite their apparent (on paper) advantages.22 One only has to focus on one issue raised by Koomey and Hultman, who have analysed past trends in reactor costs, especially as new designs lead to new complexities but without economies of scale and the consequent mass production that might make ironing out the associated problems economically possible. They note that while the ‘policy and design changes represented by Gen III+ and Gen IV reactors do represent improvements over the current fleet’,
the interlinked issues of reactor scale, customization of site-built technologies, slow electricity demand growth, intense competition from other energy sources, deregulated electricity markets, slow speed of industry learning, nuclear waste disposal, terrorism, and proliferation remain potential impediments to the cost competitiveness of next-generation nuclear power in the 21st century.23
In short, the Gen IV reactors, like the N4 reactors in the French program, may bring some interesting or even exciting improvements, but at the same time they may create significant new business risks.
The case of a new Gen III EPR (European Pressurised Reactor) being constructed by the French company Areva in Finland is suggestive. Six years after commencing construction the reactor is ‘about four years behind schedule and at least 97 percent over budget, with the loss for the provider estimated at Euro 2.7 billion ($3.9 billion)’.24
Fukushima and Renewables
The events at Fukushima thus limit the ways in which the nuclear industry can maintain momentum in a time of escalating costs. Notably, they undermine a series of industry strategies: stretching out reactor lifetimes; decreasing costs with economies of scale (which, as with Fukushima, one of the world’s largest nuclear reactor complexes, showed large vulnerability when something went wrong); the offer of investment in future technologies unproved yet by the rigours of construction and operation.
At the same time, the moment for larger scale use of renewables is upon us. Unlike nuclear power, some of these (for example, photovoltaics) can already be seen to exhibit exactly the learning curve of decreased costs with increasing production that would be expected of mass manufactured technologies.25 Already, as Schneider and colleagues report, by 2010 worldwide total installed capacity of wind turbines (193 GWe), biomass and waste-to-energy plants (65 GWe), and solar power (43 GWe), had risen to 381 GWe, exceeding the worldwide installed nuclear capacity of 375 GWe. Total investment in renewable energy technologies was estimated at USD 243 billion and the US share of renewables (with no new nuclear energy coming on line). Globally, annual additions to the world’s renewables capacity have outpaced nuclear start-ups for fifteen years.26
Fukushima highlights the value of building rapidly on these developments of renewables capability. As noted, the German government has already announced an intention to phase out reliance on nuclear power and to profit from becoming a world leader in renewables.27 The Japanese government, as it faces up to the costs of Fukushima (including establishing a publically funded compensation fund to both assist victims and save TEPCO, the company operating the Fukushima reactors), is also reviewing its energy policy. It has announced it will seek to secure electricity without depending on nuclear power too much, and in particular to front-load its target of expanding the renewable energy market to ten trillion yen by 2020. Under the revised growth strategy, it has been reported that Japan will put more emphasis on the development of renewable energy such as solar, wind and geothermal heat generated power, as well as the enhancement of electric accumulators.28
Not Just Economics
In conclusion to his comment on the nuclear industry’s economic future, Joseph Romm notes that ‘New nukes have gone from too cheap to meter to too expensive to matter for the foreseeable future’.29 Amory Lovins, consistent with his 1977 remarks, explains in a preface post Fukushima that even before events there, ‘nuclear power was dying of an incurable attack of market forces’.30 He continues,
Since new nuclear build is uneconomic and unnecessary, we needn’t debate whether it’s also proliferative and dangerous. In a world of fallible and malicious people and imperfect institutions, it’s actually both. But even after 60 years of immense subsidies and devoted effort, nuclear power still can’t clear the first two hurdles: competitiveness and need. End of story.31
Yet it is not quite the end of the story.
The nuclear industry may not be economic, but arguably it never has been. Indeed as Lovins notes, ‘every nuclear power plant under construction in the world was chosen by central planners: not one was a free-market purchase fairly competed against or compared with alternatives’.32 However, there is nothing to say that this will not continue, unless countered politically.
The nuclear industry has been developed because there was a political commitment, one way or another, from government to either build it directly or pay others to do so. In short, as noted earlier, there is an important political dimension to the implications of the economics for the industry’s future. The political dimensions of the impetus to subsidise and promote the industry are multiple: military considerations and pressures, national pride and assertions of sovereignty, the bureaucratic interests of government agencies (for example, in France), and the interests of large corporations (and energy corporations can be extremely powerful).
Further, it is important to note that I have not referred at all to the Asian markets, which have, in particular, been the hope for the nuclear industry. In a sense Fukushima is the Asian Three Mile Island/Chernobyl. For example, many of the reactors constructed or planned for Asia are on the coast and vulnerable also to storm surges or tsunamis. But the consequences will be harder to pick than in Europe and North America. We should recall that countries with strong states, firmly focused on developing long-term nuclear programs, not too fussed about local opposition from residents, and in a compliant relationship with the nuclear industry (whether because of its military role or otherwise), are in a better position to contain costs and prop up the industry’s economic base. In this sense the future of nuclear power remains, as it always has, conditioned in the end by an economics which is shaped by political forces. Therefore, in each case the outcome will be, at least in part, politically determined.
Clearly, Fukushima has implications also for the political contest. In Japan, whatever the posturing of the government and the industry, the already well-developed local capacity for opposition will be sharpened and focused by events at Fukushima.
Japan has fifty-four reactors that up until the events of Fukushima generated some 30 per cent of Japan’s electricity. Some believed it would not be long before that reached 50 per cent of electricity generation.33 Yet it is hard to believe that we will see many, if any, new reactors seriously put forward for construction in Japan given the existing strength, and likely exacerbation, of ‘nuclear allergy’ across the country. In India and China, and other parts of Asia, such as Indonesia, the situation remains more fluid. In India, opposition is intense around the proposed nuclear park in Jaitapur, but the government, while creating an independent regulation agency for nuclear power, has indicated it intends to continue with plans to increase nuclear output from 4.7GWe to 20GWe by 2020.34
China, with thirteen reactors and a further twenty-eight under construction, took some actions in response to Fukushima. Premier Wen Jiabao announced the temporary suspension of approval of nuclear projects, including those in a preliminary stage of development.35 China also initiated a comprehensive safety inspection of its nuclear facilities and updated its safety regulations; nuclear projects that do not comply will be suspended or terminated.36 Nevertheless, and even though China has ambitious renewables and energy efficiency programs, the example of France suggests that with a significant capacity to insulate a program from both its intrinsic economics and public concern, it may be some time before or until the program is seriously undermined.
In short, the implications of Fukushima are, as with other nuclear crises, to raise the stakes for opposition and industry alike. Certainly in most if not all countries, the balance of opinion will have shifted in a more critical direction by what has occurred. It would, however, be premature to say, as do some analysts, that this is the end of nuclear power. Whether it is the end, or the beginning of the end, or merely an interregnum, will depend not merely on what has happened but on how communities around the world will respond. One thing does appear certain. However the political contest over nuclear power eventually plays out, the events at Fukushima are certainly a wake-up from the industry’s more recent dreams. Others (not the least in Japan) will see this more like a reprieve (whether temporarily or, hopefully, more permanently) from a nightmare.
By Jim Falk
Jim Falk is a Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne, a United Nations University Visiting Professor, and a Director of the Climate Research Program of the Association of Pacific Rim Universities. His most recent book (with Joseph Camilleri) is Worlds in Transition: Evolving Governance across a Stressed Planet, Edward Elgar, UK, 2009.
Endnotes:
1 Arena, Special Double Issue, nos 47‒48, 1977.
2 J. Falk, ‘Australia, the New US Nuclear Policy and the International Contestation over Nuclear Power’, Arena, Special Double Issue, nos 47‒48, 1977, pp. 32‒3.
3 J. Falk, Global Fission: The Battle over Nuclear Power, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1982, pp. 23‒7.
4 A.B. Lovins, ‘Invited Testimony for Hearings on the Costs of Nuclear Power’, reprinted in ‘Alternative Long-Range Energy Strategies’, Joint Hearing before the Select Committee on Small Business and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, US Senate, 94‒47,1977, p. 1463.
5 M. Schneider, A. Froggatt and S. Thomas, The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2010–2011, Nuclear Power in a Post-Fukushima World: 25 Years After the Chernobyl Accident, Worldwatch Institute, Washington DC, Paris, Berlin, April 2011, p. 7.
6 C.A. Severance, ‘Business Risks and Costs of New Nuclear Power’, 2 January 2009.
7 Lovins, ‘Invited Testimony’.
8 I.C. Bupp, J.C. Deria et al., ‘The Economics of Nuclear Power’, Technology Review, February 1975, p. 15.
9 Severance, ‘Business Risks and Costs of New Nuclear Power’, p. 11.
10 Falk, Global Fission.
11 See Falk, Global Fission, pp. 75‒85; J. Romm, ‘The High Cost of Nuclear Power’, Testimony to the Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on
Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, US Senate, 16 July 2008; and D. Schlissel, M. Mullett and R. Alvarez, ‘Nuclear Loan Guarantees: Another Taxpayer Bailout Ahead?’, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, March 2009.
12 Cited in J. Romm, ‘Does Nuclear Power have a Negative Learning Curve?’, 6 April 2011, <www.grist.org>.
13C. Komanoff, ‘Cost Escalation in France’s Nuclear Reactors: A Statistical Examination”, January 2010, <www.komanoff.net>.
14 J. Koomey and N.E. Hultman, ‘A Reactor-level Analysis of Busbar Costs for US Nuclear Plants 1970‒2005’, Energy Policy, no. 35, 2007, pp. 5638‒9.
15Schneider, Frogatt and Thomas, The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2010–2011.
16 Schneider, Frogatt and Thomas, The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2010–2011.
17 Romm, ‘The High Cost of Nuclear Power’.
18 Severance, ‘Business Risks and Costs of New Nuclear Power’, p. 18
19 C. Perrow, ‘Fukushima, Risk, and Probability: Expect the Unexpected, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 April 2011, <www.thebulletin.org>; AAP Reuters, AP IMPACT: Asia Nuclear Reactors Face Tsunami Risk’.
20 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Study Group, The Future of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 2011, Postscript, p. xv.
21 See Falk, Global Fission, pp. 43, 53.
22 See, for example, H. Hirsch, O. Becker, M. Schneider and A. Froggatt, ‘Nuclear Reactor Hazards: Ongoing Dangers of Operating Nuclear Technology in the 21st Century’, Report Prepared for Greenpeace International, April 2005; see also updated material provided by Froggatt, ‘Potential Environmental Risks of the Next Generation of Nuclear Power Plants’, Briefing Note, October 2006, <www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk>.
23 Koomey and Hultman, ‘A Reactor-level Analysis of Busbar Costs for US Nuclear Plants 1970‒2005’, p. 5640.
24 Schneider, Frogatt and Thomas, The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2010–2011, p. 60.
25 See, for example, P. Hearps and D. McConnell, ‘Renewable Energy Technology Cost Review’, Melbourne Energy Institute Technical Paper Series, May 2011, available from <www.earthsci.unimelb.edu.au/~rogerd/Renew_Energy_Tech_Cost_Review.pdf>.
26 Hearps and McConnell, ‘Renewable Energy Technology Cost Review’, p. 7.
27 ‘Merkel Takes First Steps toward a Future of Renewables’, Spiegel Online, 15 April 2011, <www.spiegel.de>; P. McGroaty and J. Hromadko, ‘Update: Germany to Drop Nuclear Power by 2022’, The Wall Street Journal, 30 May 2011.
28 ‘Japan to Review Energy Policy’, MYsinchew.com, 5 May 2011, <www.mysinchew.com>.
29 Romm, ‘The High Cost of Nuclear Power’.
30 Lovins, in Schneider, Frogatt and Thomas, The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2010–2011, p. 5.
31 Lovins, in Schneider, Frogatt and Thomas, The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2010–2011, p. 6.
32 Lovins, in Schneider, Frogatt and Thomas, The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2010–2011, p. 4.
33 P. Kuznick, ‘Japan’s Nuclear History in Perspective: Eisenhower and Atoms for War and Peace’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 13 April 2011, <www.thebulletin.org>.
34 R.Devraj, ‘India: Fukushima Won’t Stop World’s Largest Nuclear Facility’, Inter Press Service, 29 April 2011, <www.theglobalrealm.com>.
35 Quoted in Schneider, Frogatt and Thomas, The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2010–2011, p. 42.
36 Yun Zhou, in ‘The Global Future of Nuclear Power after Fukhushima’, Power and Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 6 March 2011, <www.belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu>.